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Abstract
Much attention has been paid to China’s determination to exert its influence over the East and
South China seas using both political and military power. The final few weeks of 2013 saw a
rapid deterioration of the diplomatic goodwill that China had built with its maritime neighbours
over the past several decades, threatening regional stability and risking an arms race with the
U.S., Japan, and Southeast Asia. This article draws on some snapshots of the latest sovereignty
disputes in the East and South China seas and the bilateral ties across the Taiwan Strait to discuss
the continuities and breakpoints in China’s strategic outreach in a multipolar world. It argues that
the ability of China to pursue security interests in its maritime frontiers is largely contingent
upon many circumstantial factors.
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Not Too Peaceful:
Maritime Rifts and Governance Crises in China
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Introduction
Much attention has been paid to China’s determination to exert its influence over the East
and South China seas using both political and military power. The final few weeks of 2013 saw a
rapid deterioration of the diplomatic goodwill that China had built with its maritime neighbours
over the past several decades, threatening regional stability and risking an arms race with the
U.S., Japan, and Southeast Asia. This attempt to challenge the U.S.-dominated global order
clearly departed from former Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping’s diplomatic principle of lying low
and biding time (taoguang yanghui), aimed at normalizing relationships with the international
community and diffusing worldwide concerns about China’s threat.1
China today projects economic and political strength to rival that of the U.S. As a statemanaged economy employing gradualist reforms in a post-communist era, China distinguishes
itself as a model of development for other developing countries to follow. Meanwhile, the U.S.
invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq committed American military power to two costly campaigns.
The failure of Washington to denuclearize North Korea and Iran destroyed the perception of the
U.S. as being able to control the arms race. Detecting a shift in the balance of power in China’s
favour, the Communist leadership has advocated a global order built on multilateralism, and
formed alliances with many developing countries.
China under Hu Jintao marked itself by the concept of a peaceful rise (heping jueqi).
Through leadership that was nonthreatening to its neighbours, China asserted that it had risen
rather than stood up (qilai) in a geostrategic sense. This Chinese term for rise, jueqi, likewise
contrasts with the perceived decline of the West. Harvard historian Niall Ferguson calls China an
informal imperialist that exercises indirect power through economic dominance and military
influence. 2 Hu’s vision revealed the new confidence of Chinese leaders to access energy
resources, to reshape international institutions, and to compete with the U.S.3 The new President
Xu Jinping has differentiated himself from Hu with a new slogan of the Chinese Dream
(Zhongguo meng), expressing the desire to achieve national rejuvenation and global leadership.4
This article draws on some snapshots of the latest sovereignty disputes in the East and
South China seas and the bilateral ties across the Taiwan Strait to discuss the continuities and
breakpoints in China’s strategic outreach in a multipolar world. It argues that the ability of China
to pursue security interests in its maritime frontiers is largely contingent upon many
circumstantial factors, especially the negative attributes of globalization and the growth of
domestic discontents.
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Maritime Security in Southeast Asia
The Chinese pursuit of maritime security in Southeast Asia is far more assertive than has
been acknowledged in the media. After joining the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)
in 1991, China used the forum to strengthen ties with maritime neighbours in order to undermine
American regional influence. Seeing the U.S. trapped in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, China
appealed to Southeast Asia by endorsing multilateral structures, promoting free trade, and
initiating security arrangements. In 2005, China encouraged the formation of the East Asian
Community. Initially, China wanted to create a regional forum called “ASEAN plus Three” to
improve trading relations between all ten member states of the Association for Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) (i.e., Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines,
Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam) and the three East Asian countries of China, Japan, and South
Korea. However, Japan and other states protested and pushed China to accept the ASEAN plus
Six, a larger alliance composed of Southeast Asia, China, Japan, South Korea, India, Australia,
and New Zealand. The East Asian Community was designed to build a Chinese model of
economic integration at the expense of the U.S. Taiwan was another major economy that was
excluded, but Beijing offered Taiwanese merchants tax exemptions for exporting agricultural
products to the Mainland. This development was reminiscent of the Chinese tributary system
which had dominated the South China Sea before the age of Western imperialism. It remains
unclear whether the current development would give rise to a China-centred economic union,
and whether the Mainland market would lose its appeal in times of a financial slowdown.
Besides economic ties, the Chinese model of top-down internet governance appeals to
Southeast Asia. According to Sidney Y. Liu, many Southeast Asian leaders adhered to the
Chinese vision of the cyberspace as both an economic frontier to exploit and a political space to
restrain. They turned to China to duplicate a wide range of surveillance technologies. Vietnam
developed an internet firewall similar to China’s Great Firewall to block sensitive online
information, and Malaysia installed a Chinese-style Green Dam system. The security officials
from Thailand, Cambodia, and Myanmar received training from China in internet control tactics.
Meanwhile China doubled up the efforts to integrate all regional telecommunication networks.
The most remarkable scheme was the Great Mekong Sub-region Information Superhighway,
launched in 2004 to construct a unified telecom network from Southwest China to Myanmar,
Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam. Composed of three major telecom routes, the first one
stretched from China’s Nanning through Vietnam, from Hanoi in the north to Ho Chi Minh City
in the south, with parts of the cable reaching Laos and Cambodia. The second route expanded
from the Chinese city of Kunming to Vientiane in Laos and Bangkok in Thailand. The third one
connected Dali in China with Yangon in Myanmar. Completion of this expensive and visible
telecommunication infrastructure made China a reliable ally for these countries than either the
European Union or the U.S.5
The Chinese maritime military build-up is different from its concessive approach to
economic matters. There have been new anxieties among littoral nations like the Philippines and
Vietnam when China proclaimed the whole South China Sea to be an area of its “core concern.”6
As China invested in a blue-water navy, it regarded maritime Asia as an open frontier and saw no
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limit to project its power. 7 Since 2010, China has considered these maritime zones to be
legitimate areas in which to flex its muscles, build garrisons on strategic islands, and consolidate
air and naval strength against the U.S. The recent maritime sovereignty disputes have arisen due
to a longstanding territorial conflict in which China proclaims to have sovereignty and control
over its maritime peripheries, but Japan, Vietnam, Taiwan, Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei, and the
Philippines also claim to rule some of the resource-rich islands. In 2012, China started to prepare
for conflicts on two maritime fronts: in the South China Sea with Vietnam over three island
groups (i.e., the Spratlys, the Paracels, and Macclesfield Bank) and with the Philippines near the
disputed Scarborough Shoal or Scarborough Reef (Huangyan Island), and in the East China Sea
with Japan over the uninhabited Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands). China succeeded in using
Cambodia and Laos to out-maneuverer the claimant countries of the ASEAN and to contain the
Vietnamese and Philippine protests. This manipulative tactic was based on the premises that the
U.S. had little clout to keep the ASEAN intact, and that the ASEAN lacked a political will to
confront China.
Keen to consolidate his own power, China’s new leader Xi Jinping dismissed any
diplomatic initiatives that would weaken Chinese sovereignty claims over the disputed
territories. China, in fact, has claimed more islands and waterways than it could actually possess
under the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea. In January 2013, Chinese coastguards set out
to intercept and confiscate foreign ships entering the South China Sea, including islands claimed
by Vietnam and the Philippines. Vietnam refused to back down because of domestic protests
against territorial concessions with China.8 In the Philippines, Benigno Aquino, Jr., adopted a
tougher stance on sovereignty issues than his predecessor Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, who he
condemned as appeasing Chinese aggression. In late 2013, China’s declaration of an air defence
identification zone over disputed territories in the East China Sea added uncertainty to the
situation and disrupted the balance of power in the western Pacific. When U.S. Vice President
Joe Biden called on Xi Jinping to abandon the zone, China viewed the U.S. as an interloper to its
sphere of influence and was determined to militarize the maritime frontier.
Detecting the rising discontent over China’s power projection, the U.S. has not only
clarified the status of the East and South China seas as being open transportation corridors for all
nations, but has also urged Japan, South Korea and ASEAN to negotiate with China
multilaterally, rather than through individual bargains that would only favour Beijing at the
expense of weaker states such as the Philippines and Vietnam. To the U.S. and its allies, freedom
of the seas is an important international principle that guarantees the freedom of navigation for
vessels of all countries. Any nation’s attempt to make an open-ocean zone fall under its territorial
sovereignty contradicts this legal principle and disrupts the global system. Washington backed its
rhetoric with actions that included conducting joint military drills with Japan and the Philippines
to deter potential Chinese attacks, and expanding mutual defence assistance with Japan and
South Korea. The Obama administration deployed an advanced missile-defence system in Japan
and permitted South Korea to launch long-range ballistic missiles. In preparation for widening its
influence, the U.S. strengthened the military capacities of the Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia,
and Singapore, and connected the maritime disputes with its global anti-terrorist campaign
against the Muslim rebels within these countries.9 While Washington has reassured the ASEAN
of the U.S. presence vis-à-vis China, its response to a rising China seems moderate. The concern
for stable Sino-American relations always takes precedence over the impulse to confrontation.
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Out of fear of being marginalized, China condemned the ASEAN for siding with the U.S.
In bullying Southeast Asia, it undercut decade-long diplomatic reassurances and confidencebuilding efforts, and overplayed its hand in declaring the new air zone. Making other countries
submissive is different from the art of winning trust and exercising leadership. Trust and
leadership involves a sense of responsibility to uphold international rules and norms. China’s
refusal to back down in the maritime territorial disputes reveals the remnants of Cold War
thinking and insensitivity toward other nations’ desires for peace and stability. The costs of the
Chinese offshore power projection have outweighed all the benefits, jeopardizing its relations
with Japan, South Korea and Southeast Asia. In September 2012, Prime Minister Lee HsienLoong of Singapore warned China not to dismiss the U.S. as a declining power, and urged
Chinese leaders to resolve the sovereignty disputes through the ASEAN.10
Worse still, there was little coordination among different Chinese ministerial agencies in
handling maritime crises. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the People’s Liberation Army
lacked adequate maritime knowledge and expertise. When the Ministry of Fisheries sent its huge
surveillance boats to patrol the disputed territories, the Southeast Asian governments mistook
these vessels as regular naval ships, threatening regional stability and risking an arms race. The
absence of interagency coordination in maritime affairs made it difficult for Chinese leaders to
assess the complexity of maritime disputes and to prevent them from escalating into diplomatic
incidents. For example, China began sea trials in 2011 for its first aircraft carrier, a modified
version of a Soviet vessel, and planned to build more carriers to patrol the East China and South
China Seas. On July 25, 2012, China surprised the world by building a garrison of 1,200 soldiers
and creating the Sansha municipality on a disputed island of 2.13 square kilometres (0.82 square
miles) in the Paracels, known as Xisha in the Chinese official literature. China has utilized this
offshore base to patrol major waterways claimed by Vietnam and the Philippines, demonstrating
its willingness to use force to defend the maritime frontier. But the tiny garrison is vulnerable to
attacks by other nations because the closest Chinese territory is Hainan province, about 350
kilometres (217.48 miles) away.
These crises highlight a broader problem: no institutional mechanism exists under
international law to deal with overlapping claims to maritime territories in Asia.11 The territorial
disputes have sharpened the irreconcilable differences between China and neighbouring
countries over the control of maritime space—especially groups of resource-rich islands—and
the exercise of maritime jurisdiction related to actions taking place in international waters.
Unless there is a multilateral framework to resolve conflicts among the claimant states, maritime
rifts are likely to escalate, and the sovereignty disputes may prompt Japan and Southeast Asia to
side with the U.S. against China.

Bilateral Ties across the Taiwan Strait
China’s declaration of a vast air defence identification zone in the East China Sea directly
affected the Taiwan Strait theatre. If the declaration went unchallenged, this would be a green
light for the creation of a zone over the South China Sea, which would threaten Taiwan’s
security. As I argue elsewhere, the U.S. diplomatic cables, which were revealed by WikiLeaks,
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showed joint efforts by China and the U.S. to prevent Taiwan, particularly under former
president Chen Shui-bian during the period of 2000–2008, from drifting into independence.12
When China recognized its failure to deal with Chen’s pro-independence stance through coercive
diplomacy, it turned to the U.S. for help, undermining Chen’s referendum for the island’s
admission into the United Nations. International observers have confirmed some informal
cooperation between Beijing and Washington as neither side wants an independent Taiwan.
China fears the effect that would have on its territorial integrity, and the U.S. does not want to
risk its diplomatic relationship with China and possibly a war. The cables demonstrated a
qualitative shift in U.S. strategy from using Taiwan to contain the rise of China towards
stabilizing the triangular relationship and maintaining the balance of power across the Taiwan
Strait. In the tangled political web, everything has shifted in China’s favour. While China used
economic co-optation to restrict the pro-independence force, it deliberately marginalized the
nation by stopping Taiwanese participation in international organizations and by targeting its few
diplomatic allies.
Despite diplomatic tensions, Taiwan’s economic ties with China have expanded since
2000. Taiwan’s investment in China amounted to US$2.6 billion in 2000, representing 34% of
the country’s outward investment. This figure rose to US$14.6 billion in 2010, around 84% of its
outward investment. More Taiwanese enterprises found China an attractive destination for
expansion. 40% of Taiwan’s exports went directly to China in 2011 compared to 26% in 2001,
and Taiwanese exports to the U.S., Japan, and the European Union declined in the same decade.
China has risen to be the second important trading nation for Taiwan.13
Nonetheless, distrust remained between the top Chinese and Taiwanese leaders. The
threat of the Chinese invasion still loomed over the Strait. To counter this threat, Taiwan needed
to acquire military technology from the U.S. to modernize its defence system. In 2008, the
US$6.5 billion arms sales package included Patriot anti-ballistic missiles, a retrofit for E-2T antisubmarine aircraft, Apache helicopters, Harpoon anti-ship missiles, and Javelin anti-vehicle
missiles. In 2010, the US$6.4 billion military package entailed sixty Black Hawk helicopters,
114 Patriot anti-missile systems, twelve Harpoon missiles, two minesweepers, and a command
and control enhancement system. These weapons strengthened the Taiwanese military in
conventional warfare and symbolised the American commitment to defending the island.14
Arms sales to Taiwan greatly affected the Sino-American and cross-Strait relations.
China regarded the arms sales as a violation of its proclaimed sovereignty over Taiwan. Faced
with the anger of Chinese nationalistic youth, who demanded economic and military sanctions
against the U.S., Chinese Lieutenant General Ma Xiaotan criticised the arms sales as the greatest
obstacle in Sino-American relations in June 2009.15 China, however, chose to prevent the arms
sales from hurting its improved ties with Taiwan.
The failure of China to stop the U.S. transfer of military technology to Taiwan made the
one-China principle an illusion more than a reality, but Taiwan could never catch up with the
fast-growing Chinese military. From 2001 to 2010, China increased military spending by 189%,
an average annual increase of 12.5%. Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou stressed that under the
Chinese threat, Taiwan should incorporate all elements of strategic power projection, including
the build-up of conventional military defence and deterrence, the expansion of strategic ties with
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the U.S., Japan and Southeast Asia, and the promotion of Taiwanese democratic values and
practices among Mainland citizens.16
As Taiwan drifts into a Chinese orbit, its politicians need to assess the pros and cons of
being closely linked to Beijing. The Taiwan issue still remains at the heart of Sino-American
relations. Perceiving China as a competitor, U.S. President Barack Obama’s pivot toward the
Pacific after years of anti-terrorism efforts in Central Asia and the Middle East is significant. Not
only does it make Taiwan an important bargaining chip in negotiations with China, but it also
offers the nation the autonomy to establish its own agenda.

Domestic Discontents and Governance Crises
China’s ability to balance against the U.S. in maritime Asia is contingent upon many
circumstantial factors. Over the last decade, China’s leaders favoured pragmatism over ideology,
and called for consensus-building and multilateralism in dispute resolution. They opened
themselves to negotiate and compromise with any government. Before Aung San Suu Kyi was
freed from house arrest in November 2010, Chinese officials met with Burmese opposition
leaders in Beijing for talks on future collaboration. Shortly after Arab Spring swept through the
Middle East and North Africa, China negotiated with revolutionary leaders in Tunisia, Egypt,
Libya, and Syria for deepening economic ties. Aware of the vulnerability of its overseas strategic
interests and investments in the event of a collapse of the government, China has worked to
balance the interests of all factions. As with his predecessors, Xi Jinping continues to exploit
foreign affairs to foster internal stability and economic development, but he has yet to overcome
four institutional limitations. These obstacles are exacerbated by several explosive factors such
as a lack of prosperity, high inflation and unemployment rates, rampant corruption, and
incompetent government that is devoid of democratic legitimacy.
First, China’s rise to power is not peaceful at all. Its pursuit of strategic security is fraught
with paradoxes, and has destabilized domestic politics. As Beijing failed to resolve maritime
sovereignty disputes with neighbours through negotiation, many netizens organized protests to
express their nationalist sentiments and destroyed foreign factories in China. The waves of
nationalism have swept across the country with the public outcry for sanctions against foreign
countries and the hostile remarks by commanders of the People’s Liberation Army. The
widespread “China can say No” attitude has prevented the Chinese leaders from embracing new
diplomatic initiatives to solve the disputes.
Second, hostility towards liberal intellectuals, critical journalists, and ethnic minorities
continues in present-day China. Imprisonment of Nobel Peace Prize laureate Liu Xiaobo,
persecution of Tibetan Buddhists and Uyghur Muslims, and forced exile of dissidents show that
the state has tightened its grip upon the citizenry despite its rhetoric of tolerance and compassion.
In Chongqing municipality, Bo Xilai, son of revolutionary hero Bo Yibo, gained much attention
employing Maoist rhetoric and state-sponsored welfare projects for political gain. In Beijing,
Zhou Yongkang, who controlled the national public security forces, was purged in Xi Jinping’s
anti-corruption campaigns. With the downfall of Bo Xilai and Zhou Yongkang, the Communist
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leadership has demonstrated its awkwardness in resolving the contradictions of both Maoist past
and reformist present. Displays of assertiveness and confidence occur, moreover, with rising
discontents that inhibit real self-assertiveness. Since the 2008 financial crisis, Chinese leaders
have recognized the need to transform its export-led economy into one driven by domestic
consumption. Nevertheless, the dramatic political crises in the wake of the fall of Bo Xilai and
Zhou Yongkang, the leadership succession, and the anti-corruption campaigns in 2014
discouraged any ambitious leaders from addressing these structural problems and experimenting
liberal reforms.
Third, the reality of an economic slowdown in China suggests that while state-led
capitalism has run its course, the Chinese Communist Party cannot appeal to its neighbours with
material incentives. China today has to confront many negative attributes of globalization.
Unprecedented growth gave China a temporary reprieve but the national economy has slowed
down and the state has yet to offer a sustainable developmental strategy. According to Carl E.
Walter and Fraser J. T. Howie, the state refused to transfer power to entrepreneurs and financial
professionals, while ruling elites mainly used state-run commercial banks to drive growth that
covered up nonperforming debts and distorted the value of bank assets.17 Whereas sustainable
growth required China’s consumers to buy more local products, urging a massive transfer of
wealth to the citizenry in order to do so, the state did the opposite by increasing spending on
fixed investment. The injection of stimulus money into state-owned enterprises and large
infrastructure projects was not sustainable. Since late 2011, many private enterprises have been
bankrupt because they lacked the connections to secure bank loans that could resolve their cash
flow problems. Whether or not China postpones a crisis for the time being, the days of being
perceived as the world’s economic miracle are numbered.
Finally, market liberalization is a double-edged sword. The rapidity with which the state
has achieved growth has created tensions and conflicts at all levels. Extremely efficient and
highly urban, China’s development has yielded growth rates above those of most developed
nations. But its new wealth is unevenly distributed, its labour market ruthless, and its living
environment Dickensian. Because of popular grievances caused by the state’s aggressive
development strategies and reluctance to liberalize its authoritarian system, a rising China that
denies its citizens what they desire—such as job security, healthcare, gender equality and
freedom—drives discontented sections of society to mobilize for collective action in order to
guarantee security, solace and justice. Popular protest has become a prominent mode of political
participation, and the dangers of ineffective governance are reflected internally. As many as
180,000 strikes, demonstrations and protests were reported in 2010. This is an average of 493
incidents per day. This official figure indicates a dramatic increase from the 90,000 incidents
documented in 2006 and fewer than 9,000 in the mid-1990s.18 The fear of domestic instability
may prompt the top leadership to concentrate on stability maintenance rather than external power
projection.

Conclusion
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The latest maritime sovereignty disputes and the cross-Strait ties clearly revealed a
qualitative shift in China’s strategy from forging alliance with neighbours to competing with the
U.S. But China shared fewer strategic interests with Southeast Asia and failed to limit the U.S.
influence in the Pacific waters. Throughout the disputes, the U.S. pressurized China to negotiate
with Southeast Asia, Japan, and Taiwan. If China wants to retain some room for manoeuvre, it
must devise a viable mechanism for resolving maritime conflicts and engaging with Taiwan.
Faced with the concern about China’s threat to regional stability, Beijing expressed no intention
to challenge the U.S.-dominated international system, but this rhetoric has little appeal among
regional governments.
In a nutshell, China does not need to follow the logic of a zero-sum game in its
encounters with neighbouring states. Its gain should not lead to another country’s loss. To build
trust and confidence with the global community, China should recognize the East and South
China seas as international transportation corridors for all countries, and formulate innovative
mechanisms for dispute resolution. Otherwise, it will miss the opportunity to set the course of
action for the future and find itself caught in serious diplomatic rifts.
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